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Abstract
In David Tudor’s electronic music, home-brew modular devices were carefully connected together to
form complex feedback networks wherein all components—including the composer/performer
himself—could only partially ‘influence’ one another. Once activated, the very instability of
mismatched connections between the components triggered a cascade of signals and signal
modulations, so that the work “composed itself,” and took “a life of its own.” Due to this self-
producing, perpetuating nature of his works, Tudor insisted on what he called “the view from inside,”
focusing more on the internal observation of his devices and sound than in materials external to the
immanence of performance. When Tudor passed away in 1996, it became apparent that the sheer lack
of resources outside the work—scores, instructions, recordings, texts—had made many of his music
impossible to perform in his absence. The works that took a life of their own could not survive their
composer’s death partially because of his utter reliance on them to do their work. By connecting often
mismatched resources obtained from extended research on Tudor, this paper presents modular
observations that seem to offer certain perspectives on the issue of life and death surrounding Tudor’s
music. A comparison with developments in systems theory, most notably autopoiesis, outlines a
mechanism for the endless life of sounds that compose themselves. Moving out of this theoretical
reflection, a fieldwork report of an ongoing attempt to ‘revive’ some of Tudor's works is offered. This
report demonstrates the observer shifting from one ‘inside’ to another—from an electronic circuitry
inside a particular device, to a network composed of several devices, and further into the activation of
a composite instrument. Meandering away from the archives, the composer’s “view from inside” of
his electronic devices is set side by side with recent insights of object-oriented ontology. A certain
portion of this observation then feeds itself back to the perspective of autopoiesis, while others
proceed to extract a distinct notion of ‘life’ out of object-orientation, this time in programming: an
indeterminate ‘waiting’ time inherent in each ‘object’ that cannot be computed within a singular
universal time. This latency embedded in objects that await activation correlates to the trajectory of
the observer who is always in a transit from one ‘inside’ to another, finding different objects on each
level of observation, and for whom, therefore, the delineation between life and death is always
indeterminate. This view provides further explanation to the operative mechanism of Tudor’s music,
wherein mismatched components sought to activate and influence one another, constituting an
‘electronic ecology’ endowed with a life of its own, but filled with partial deaths. The paper thus
observes ultimately a parallel between the composer’s trajectory within his performances and that
within his life, while attempting to reenact the complex nature of these said trajectories through the
meandering manner of its own delivery.
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Either one is alive or one is dead. 
Niklas Luhmann 
 
What is death for the beholder? What is death for the dying? 
Humberto Maturana 
 
 
1 
The composer David Tudor passed away on August 13, 1996. Following his 
death, it quickly became apparent that a large part of his electronic music was 
gone with him. There were several works that he had passed on to other people—
including Rainforest IV that members of ‘Composers Inside Electronics’ had been 
performing since the inception of the group following a summer workshop that 
Tudor led in 1973; or a later series of works employing the Neural Network 
synthesizer (Neural Network Plus and Neural Synthesis) that Tudor’s then-
assistant John D.S. Adams had learned from the composer just before his death. 
But the majority of Tudor’s idiosyncratic compositions seemed utterly impossible 
to perform in the absence of the composer, who was their primary, and most times 
the only, performer. The evident obstacle was the sheer scarcity or utter lack of all 
the vicarious, primarily textual, materials that usually stand in as more stable 
proxies for the ephemerality of sounds—scores, instructions, descriptions, 
interviews, articles, and recordings. It was as if Tudor had deliberately restrained 
the production of materials external to his music. There were objects—a large 
number of instruments made by the composer and other people—but they 
remained esoteric (particularly to musicologists) and mostly inoperative. The only 
way to proceed seemed to carefully connect the limited and often mismatched 
resources together to form a chain of observation. 
Tudor had turned himself into a composer of electronic music in the mid-
1960s, after almost two decades of a remarkable career as the most virtuosic 
pianist of post-war experimental and avant-garde music. He worked closely with 
prominent composers at the time, such as Pierre Boulez, Karlheinz Stockhausen, 
Christian Wolff, and most notably, John Cage. Tudor as a performer was reticent, 
being inside the works of other eloquent composers who were more than happy to 
do the talking. But even after he started composing, Tudor refrained from writing 
or talking about his works. This ostensible quietness is often described as 
pertaining to the composer’s nature by people who knew him: “It was very much 
David’s nature; other people would talk about doing stuff, but David would do the 
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stuff.”1 Nevertheless, in the few occasions where he did talk about his works, 
Tudor also talked about why they needed no talking about them. In Bandoneon! 
(1966), his first substantial effort as a composer, Tudor used the instrument in the 
title, both as a sound source and as an interface to activate the distribution and 
modulation of sounds, switching of loudspeakers and lighting, as well as the 
projection of visual images by Lowell Cross. The program note claimed that the 
work, “when activated, (…) composes itself out of its own composite 
instrumental nature.”2 For Rainforest (1968-76), Tudor set out to build “an 
orchestra of loudspeakers, each speaker being as unique as any musical 
instrument,”3 by attaching audio transducers onto various physical objects. The 
composer thought this “was a nice piece because it would teach itself.”4 It was as 
if these works, left to their own devices, took care of themselves, rendering all 
external language unnecessary and irrelevant. Or, in Tudor’s own concise 
explanation: “it is they who are doing it.”5 Tudor’s unwillingness to talk or write 
about his works was in this way partially conditioned by the very nature of the 
same works. 
 
2 
To describe in a generic manner, the nature of Tudor’s music was based on 
modular electronic devices connected in chains to form complex feedback 
networks. Once activated, a signal would be distributed throughout the network, 
passing through various gain stages, filters, and modulators, before being fed back 
to repeat the process over and over again. The multiple channels of signals would 
be transduced and output from loudspeakers at different points of the network. 
These loudspeakers were often distributed across the space to particularize the 
perception of sound at a given location. The output sounds could then be fed back 
once more into the electronic circuitry either through microphones (acoustic 
feedback), or via Tudor the performer who would decide on his next maneuver 
based on what entered his ears. Not that accurate control was possible, for                                                                                                                 
1 Phil Edelstein, Interview by author, Long Island, NY, November 19, 2011. 
2 David Tudor, “Program Notes for Nine ‘Evenings (1966),” Los Angeles: David Tudor 
Papers, Getty Research Institute, Box 3. 
3 David Tudor and John David Fullemann, “‘…performing is very much like cooking: 
putting it all together, raising the temperature’ (May 31, 1984, Stockholm),” 
http://davidtudor.org/Articles/fullemann.html (April 1, 2014). 
4 David Tudor and Matt Rogalsky, “Interview with David Tudor by Matt Rogalsky 
(March 28, 1995, Tomkins Cove, NY),” 
http://davidtudor.org/Articles/rogalsky_inter2.html (April 1, 2014). 
5 David Tudor, “Note (circa 1975?)”, Los Angeles: David Tudor Papers, Getty Research 
Institute, Box 19. 
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indeterminacy permeated Tudor’s system on multiple levels. The sheer 
complexity of the circuitry based on parallel channels of feedback exceeded the 
capacity of the human performer to fully predict or control its behavior. As Tudor 
recounted, referring to his realization of Cage’s Variations II (1960), in which he 
implemented electronic amplification to his piano constructing one of the earliest 
examples of an instrumental system based on complex feedback—“you could 
only hope to influence the instrument.”6  
A similar relationship based on indeterminacy also existed between the 
components themselves. Tudor often neglected the usual practice in the building 
of modular synthesizers to match the voltage or impedance between devices to 
ensure the clarity of signals.7 Instead, he deliberately mismatched his components 
to obtain additional layers of noise/signal, describing the resulting relationship 
among components with the same verb he used to address the relationship 
between himself and them: “with a synthesizer you match up each component 
with the next one, so that each input can handle the previous output. I found out 
that if the components don't match, then the one component is able to influence 
the next, so that signals are created at many points within the circuit”8 [emphasis 
added]. The whole network was thus carefully put together so that all 
components—including the human performer—could partially ‘influence’ one 
another, without any taking over universal control. Once activated, the very 
instability of partial connections within the feedback network incited oscillations 
of diverse character, triggering a cascade of signals and signal modulations.9 The                                                                                                                 
6 Ray Wilding-White, “David Tudor: 10 selected realizations of graphic scores and related 
performances (1973),” Los Angeles: David Tudor Papers, Getty Research Institute, Box 
19. 
7 “Every time I’ve had to use the synthesizer, or a synthesizer component, I had something 
outboard to it that then would change the way it operates. It’s mostly because all the 
considerations of the voltage, you know, where voltage needs to correspond to what the 
output signal level is—that’s all coordinated. And if you manage to uncoordinated that, 
then you are in a completely different position” (David Tudor, “Workshop with students 
at Mobius, Boston, September 29, 1985,” Los Angeles: David Tudor Papers, Getty 
Research Institute, Box2A, C75). 
8 David Tudor, “From Piano to Electronics,” Music and Musicians 20 (August 1972): 26. 
9 For a more detailed and specific account of how Tudor’s compositions operate, see Ron 
Kuivila’s description of Untitled: Homage to Toshi Ichiyanagi (1972) (Kuivila, “Open 
Sources: Words, Circuits and the Notation-Realization Relation in the Music of David 
Tudor,” Leonardo Music Journal, Vol. 14 (2004): 17-23). Upon a closer observation, 
Tudor’s trajectory also reveals a certain shift in the nature of his works around the mid-
1970s. His initial exploration into the electronic generation and modulation of sounds 
through feedback with no external input resulted in a proliferation of devices, which 
presented two problems: the sheer controllability of the composite instrument (the 
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composition, in other words, composed itself from within.  
What is heard as music to the human ear is the sonic expression of these 
multiple components ‘influencing’ (or, hoping to influence) each other, both in 
space, and within the circuitry. And following the composer’s own wording—as 
when he explained how with the instrumental loudspeakers of Rainforest, “the 
objects should teach you what it wants to hear”10 [emphasis added]—the action on 
the receiving end of this chain of influences could be portrayed as ‘listening,’ or 
‘hearing.’11 In Tudor’s music, the human listener listens to components                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
degree of influence, so to speak), and its portability for tours with the Cunningham 
Company. As Tudor recalled, ”I came to a situation where my hands were completely 
tied to the performance trying to do the generation,” but on top of that, ”I couldn't take 
four suitcases of equipment” (Tudor, ”Workshop with students at Mobius, Boston, 
September 29, 1985”). The composer’s solution to this double predicament was simple 
yet effective. He recorded the output of sound generation, and in performances used this 
recording as source material to be processed through a much more simplified circuitry. 
But this tactic had a significant side effect: it triggered Tudor to shift his focus from 
sound generation to modulation of pre-recorded sound sources. From the late 1970s, 
Tudor’s music leaned towards the use of pre-recorded sound materials that went through 
multiple, parallel modulating channels—consisting mostly of noise gates, pitch shifters, 
various filters, and so on—which were then output from multiple speakers. Despite this 
change of focus narrated by the composer himself, it is my view that Tudor’s general 
approach remained basically coherent. Just as the initiating signal that triggers the 
process of oscillation in a no-input setting cannot be determined in advance, nor it 
matters what its nature is, the properties of sound material to be processed was 
secondary to the processing itself: ”it wasn’t important which take it [sound source] 
was, it wasn't important where the take started, it just meant you had to have something 
to generate the process” (Tudor, ibid.). Whether external input was used or not, Tudor’s 
focus was always on the behavior of the overall network of his components (moreover, 
the use of pre-recorded sound material had already appeared in Pepsibird and Anima 
Pepsi from 1970). 10  David Tudor and Matt Rogalsky, “Interview with David Tudor by Matt Rogalsky 
(March 28, 1995, Tomkins Cove, NY),” 
http://davidtudor.org/Articles/rogalsky_inter2.html (April 1, 2014).  
11 The use of the verb ‘listening’ to address the workings of electronic devices has a long 
history in electronic music, and was already in use among some of Tudor’s 
collaborators as can be seen in Gordon Mumma’s wording that appears later in this 
paper. For a general survey of (more recent) musical systems that ‘listen,’ see for 
instance: Robert Rowe, Interactive Music Systems: Machine Listening and Composing 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993). As demonstrated in Rowe’s title, the crucial point 
in the application of this verb to non-human devices is in its strict coupling with the 
ability to respond to what is ‘listened,’ in a complex, nonsingular (indeterminate) 
manner, and hence to ‘interact’ with the human performer accordingly. This 
acknowledgement of ‘listening’ via the observation of consequent response, or more 
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influencing and listening to each other—“it is they who are doing it.” And when 
they did what they did, Tudor saw them as springing to life: “there is a point 
where a certain sound-world or a certain color conception can appear, an 
electronic set up that's hooked together with a certain idea. And all of a sudden 
you realize that it has a life of its own.”12 Similar observation employing the same 
wordings was even adopted by other composers to account for Tudor’s music: 
“With David Tudor,” Cage stated in 1987, “the components, the circuitry is the 
music, and it comes alive when it is performed.”13  
This attribution of ‘life’ to Tudor’s music had one peculiar consequence: 
his performances were notoriously never-ending. For how could something that 
springs to life and composes itself once activated, end? Whenever Tudor 
performed with the Merce Cunningham Dance Company, which he regularly did 
throughout his career, it was customary for him to abruptly halt the music when 
the choreography reached its end. Matt Rogalsky recounts another anecdote 
demonstrating that finishing was not Tudor’s concern: “at a Mills College concert 
in the late 1960s, (…) Tudor is said to have been cautiously questioned as his 
performance showed no signs of coming to a conclusion, while the hour was 
growing late: his response was to stand up and abruptly turn off the sound, with 
the comment ‘I still had lots to do’.”14 It was this seeming indifference towards 
endings that took an ironic turn after 1996. The dedication to the immanence of 
performed life correlated to a certain disregard for the time and materiality outside 
the living present. The works that took a life of their own and knew no end in 
performances thus seemed to accompany the fate of their creator—who was also                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
accurately, via the perception of a nonlinear relation between input and output, connects 
to the tendency of programmers to observe subjectivity and affect in programming 
objects through their indeterminate ‘waiting,’ that will be discussed in section 9. It also 
extends, therefore, to the use of ‘listening’ based on ‘cues’ in the works of Christian 
Wolff, as described in footnote 42. The only non-electronic piece in the repertoire of 
‘Composers Inside Electronics’ was Wolff ’s Changing the System (1972), which Phil 
Edelstein from the group described as ”a school for listening” necessary for performing 
Tudor’s Rainforest: “that was the training ground, to a certain extent. And you know, 
David was never quite explicit about that as Pauline (Oliveros), or Christian was, but it 
was there, you had to be able to do it” (Phil Edelstein, Interview by author, Long Island, 
NY, November 19, 2011). 
12 David Tudor and Teddy Hultberg, “’I smile when the sound is singing through the 
space’: An Interview with David Tudor by Teddy Hultberg (May 17-18, 1988, 
Dusseldorf),” http://davidtudor.org/Articles/hultberg.html (April 1, 2014). 
13 John Cage and Bruce Duffie, ”Composer John Cage: A Conversation with Bruce Duffie 
(June 21, 1987),” http://www.bruceduffie.com/cage.html (April 1, 2014). 
14 Matt Rogalsky, “‘Nature’ as an Organising Principle,” Organised Sound 15-2 (2010): 
134. 
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the single component within the system responsible for initiating its activation—
when his life came to an end.  
 
3 
Almost two decades have passed since the composer's death. When the current 
observer looks back from his viewpoint outside the immanence of Tudor's 
performances, the idea of creating compositions that compose themselves through 
chains of feedback conceived circa mid-1960s appears comparable to 
contemporary developments in cybernetics or systems theory in general. Tudor 
spoke nothing about it of course, and none of his notes show any interest in this 
regard. Discourses of cybernetics therefore seem to have laid outside the 
composer’s concern. But they were certainly in the environment, and Gordon 
Mumma, a colleague musician from the Cunningham Company who worked on 
several projects with Tudor and built him several instruments, was well aware of 
the parallel. ‘Influenced’ by cybernetics, Mumma coined the term ‘cybersonic’ to 
address his self-built instruments from which he composed music that operated on 
feedback principles. For instance, in Hornpipe (1967), a cybersonic console 
attached to the hornist “listens (with microphone)” 15 and analyzes the resonances 
of the performance space from the sounds of the horn, creating an electronic 
analog of the same resonant characteristics. This “map of [the space’s] resonant 
spectrum”16 is later sent out from the loudspeakers once a certain threshold has 
been attained within the circuitry. Mumma described this process as a three-fold 
interplay between the human performer, the cybersonic console, and the 
‘personality’ of the auditorium. 
But both Tudor and Mumma went beyond the naïve premises of 
cybernetics. For at the core of their systems were factors of noise and 
indeterminacy that distorted any intention for regulated control of its operation. 
Sound was generated and modulated via the very failure of cybernetic control. 
The human composer-performer was accordingly seen not as a privileged 
observer who oversees the entirety of the composition but as a local component 
within the system; and machines, contrary to the cybernetic perspective, were no 
longer regarded as mere ‘servo-mechanisms.’ “If we admit of [sic] musical 
performance as social intercourse,” Mumma wrote in his ‘Notes on Cybersonics’ 
in 1970, “then we may include the varieties of artificial intelligence in our musical 
ensembles: not merely for their sophistication and speed, but also for the 
contribution of their personalities. We may treat the artificial intelligence not as a                                                                                                                 
15 Gordon Mumma, “Notes on Cybersonics: Artificial Intelligence in Live Musical 
Performance,” Los Angeles: David Tudor Papers, Getty Research Institute, Box 38. 
16 Mumma, ibid. 
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slave, but as a collaborative equal in a democratic musical society.”17 This 
egalitarian view on machines and humans inside a musical system resembles not 
cybernetics, but ‘cybernetics of cybernetics’ that Heinz von Foerster and others 
were articulating circa 1970.18 Contemplating on the role of the observer who 
inevitably enters and affects the operation of the system itself, von Foerster 
formulated the cybernetics of ‘observing systems’ as opposed to that of ‘observed 
systems.’ But the attribution of ‘personalities’ to electronic components (as well 
as the concert space), adds a further twist to this second-order cybernetics, by 
distributing the capacity for distinct observation (and listening) to all the 
components of the system. Not only the observer is included within the system, 
but his position is no longer stable nor singular since the other components return 
their gaze to him.  
 
4 
The difference between the observations of the observer and the system itself was 
theorized by one idiosyncratic theory of living systems that was developed in 
close relation to second-order cybernetics by Chilean neurophysicist and biologist 
Humberto Maturana and his former student Francisco Varela in the early 1970s: 
Autopoiesis. A simple observation formed the basis of their approach to living 
systems: there is always a gap between what an observer says about a system and 
the constitutive organization of the system itself. When this difference is 
thoroughly pursued, many characteristics endowed to living systems in previous 
theories are revealed to exist only inside the perspective of the observer and his 
domain of description. From here, Maturana and Varela made a radical move to 
dispense altogether with the perspective of an exterior observer. The list of things 
they excluded from the organization of living systems runs long: teleology, 
function, development, time, and even the notion of input and output of systems. 
When seen from its own standpoint, the operation of a living system is a closed 
network of processes of production (transformation) of components that produces 
the components that continuously regenerate the network of process that produced 
them—once activated, it might be added. Maturana and Varela stick to the 
forefront edge of the production process, describing happenstances only as they 
emerge and letting them go without retaining them in time: “the organism always 
behaves in the present.”19 The actual, physical components, along with the static,                                                                                                                 
17 Mumma, ibid. 
18 See for instance: Heinz von Foerster, et al. eds, Cybernetics of Cybernetics (Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois, Biological Computer Laboratory, 1974). 
19 Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization 
of the Living (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1980), 24. 
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spatial relations between them—which autopoiesis calls ‘structures’—are mere 
products of the process of production, and not the other way around. Maturana 
and Varela claimed that this notion of autopoiesis was the necessary and sufficient 
to characterize living systems.20 It was not only that living systems are 
autopoietic, but any system that is autopoietic, is living.  
Only a small adjustment is necessary and sufficient to describe Tudor’s 
compositions that compose themselves as autopoietic systems, and thus as living: 
to regard not his instruments, but the sound/signal they produce through their 
listening processes, as components of the system. For the instruments, after all, 
are already composed and composited before the concert. What becomes 
spontaneously composed in performance is a processual network of generation, 
transformation, and perception of sound/signals that produces the sound/signals 
that continuously regenerate the same network. The perpetual life of listened 
sounds and sound listening forms a topological closure that can neither be reduced 
to the architectural space where the concert is held, nor to the physical 
configuration of instruments.  
Contrary to Maturana and Varela’s attempt to exclude any trace of an 
external observer in accounting for systems, however, the existence of an 
autopoietic system depends largely on what the observer defines as the 
‘component’ of a system. Rather than being an accurate description of living 
systems, the autopoietical approach is primarily a heuristic device. That is to say, 
the observer’s choice for what to describe as an autopoietic system is a choice, 
and therefore never neutral. The gain of connecting autopoiesis to Tudor’s music 
(or more accurately, to the account of his music) is not so much in what it enables, 
but in what it fails to explain. Maturana had begun his introduction to the book 
Autopoiesis with a poem that the biologist wrote when he was a first year medical 
student. The poem—which the author admits is “not a very good one”—starts by 
posing two questions: “What is death for the beholder?/What is death for the 
dying?” It ends with a single proposition: “And life without death is only 
emptiness.”21 But the theory he developed as a scientist did not reflect his 
concerns as poet. Death is the ultimate outside of the autopoietic closure, strictly 
correlated to external observation. As far as system itself was concerned, it would 
simply live permanently until it did not. Life without death is a tautology and thus 
empty (of meaning), indeed: “Since the relations of production of components are 
given only as processes, if the processes stop, the relations of production 
vanish.”22 Next to this issue of death (the impossibility thereof) was another, 
similarly ordinary phenomena that autopoiesis just could not describe: the                                                                                                                 
20 Maturana and Varela, ibid., 82. 
21 Maturana and Varela, ibid., xi.  
22 Maturana and Varela, ibid., 79. 
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multiplicity of autopoietic systems that gather together to form an aggregate 
system. Maturana and Varela spent more than a decade trying to explain how an 
operationally closed living system which knows no outside or inside could find its 
other, and conjoin to form another system like itself without losing its autopoietic 
nature.23 
The external observer can clearly see how these two conundrums of 
autopoiesis are coupled. For death and multiplicity are both phenomena that can 
only be observed from a view outside a given, singular living system. The 
multiplicity of systems is the multiplicity of exteriority from where an observer 
can account for their deaths. The autopoietic account of Tudor’s music thus fails 
to describe the difficult yet inevitable ending of performances, as well as the 
difference between one work and another. For Tudor’s music did reach a halt 
every evening and the composer always composed a new work. The question is 
never quite as simple as whether a system is autopoietic and thus living. The 
question is rather which system is to be described as autopoietic, when, and why. 
And the particularities of the answer necessarily pertain to an observer who is free 
to make that choice because he is free from the choices themselves. 
 
5 
In 1976, Tudor wrote a short manifesto-like text entitled “The View from Inside,” 
for the program note of his concert with ‘Composers Inside Electronics’: 
Electronic components & circuitry, observed as individual & 
unique rather than as servomechanisms, more & more reveal their 
personalities, directly related to the particular musician involved 
with them. The deeper this process of observation, the more the 
components seem to require & suggest their own musical ideas, 
arriving at that point of discovery, always incredible, where music 
is revealed from ‘inside,’ rather than from ‘outside.’24 
The words which describe electronic components as non-subservient and the gaze 
that sees their personalities, accord well to Mumma’s ‘Notes on Cybernetics.’ But                                                                                                                 
23 Niklas Luhmann solved this puzzle by simply regarding the social system as an entirely 
different autopoietic system whose components were not humans, but communication. 
Humans were not components of society, but rather formed its ”environment.” See for 
instance: Niklas Luhmann, ”The Autopoiesis of Social Systems,” in Sociocybernetic 
Paradoxes: Observation, Control and Evolution of Self-Steering Systems, eds. F. Geyer 
and J. Van d. Zeuwen (London: Sage, 1986), 172-92. 
24 David Tudor, “The View from Inside (1976),” Los Angeles: David Tudor Papers, Getty 
Research Institute, Box 19, Folder 11. 
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the topological trope here addresses the depth of observational process of 
circuitry, and not the immersion into sounds with a life of their own. This view 
from inside, in other words, is the view of the ‘composer’ who delves into his 
components to discover a new music through his observation, and gives a name to 
a particular musical idea to distinguish it from another. In this way, he produces a 
unity of ‘composition’ that cannot be reduced to the instantiations of its 
performed life. And as a composer he will indeed produce many of them 
throughout his life.  
The earlier description of the nature of Tudor’s composite instruments was 
generic. It was intended as such to form a correlative to the level of observation 
that saw the interminable life of sounds. But there is an ‘inside,’ located outside of 
the autopoietic process of production. And Tudor’s observation of ‘life’ oscillated 
between these two insides. “There’s always a certain point where the work that 
you do to realize these musical ideas, all of a sudden it has a life of its own, and 
that’s the point where I decide that it’s my musical composition. When it’s living 
for itself then I feel, ‘Okay, I can sign my name to that.’”25 In a peculiar manner, 
the composer obtained a work that belonged to him at the very moment it left his 
hands. Then, relieved of his duty, the composer would become a performer within 
his composition that now lives for itself: “when the process is really living, I can 
set to work and not really worry about it”26 But before this life is fully composed, 
the observer encounters components quite other than autopoietic sounds within 
Tudor’s ‘view from inside’: electronic objects. 
 
6 
There are two primary archives for Tudor’s materials. One is the David Tudor 
Papers at the Getty Research Institute (GRI) in Los Angeles, storing 177.5 linear 
feet of his paper documents which include sketches, schematics, notes, diagrams, 
letters, magazine cutouts, photographs, articles, recipes (Tudor was a virtuosic 
cook of Indian food), realization scores from his pianist days, as well as 
recordings from tapes that Tudor owned. The other is the World Instrument 
Collection at Wesleyan University which has assembled more than 500 of 
Tudor’s electronic instruments and equipments.27 These are a mixture of devices,                                                                                                                 
25 David Tudor and Bruce Duffie, “Presenting David Tudor: A Conversation with Bruce 
Duffie (April 7, 1986, Chicago),” http://www.bruceduffie.com/tudor3.html (April 1, 
2014). 
26 Tudor and Duffie, ibid. 
27 There was a significant amount of instruments at the basement of Merce Cunningham 
Dance Company, but these have been surveyed and transferred to Wesleyan in April 
2012. The Cunningham Dance Company also holds a substantial amount of 
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many made by Tudor himself, some by others (including Gordon Mumma, John 
Fullemann, and John Driscoll), along with a large number of commercial 
equipments (mostly guitar pedals that the composer heavily used from the late-
1970s onwards). Going back and forth between California and Connecticut, I 
have been conducting research with aims to ‘revive’ some of Tudor’s works.28 
Inside each archive, one must switch back and forth materials on at least three 
levels to discern the operative mechanism of each composition: A) the individual 
instruments, B) the composite instrument formed by connecting multiple 
instruments, and C) the performance of it all. Different materials exist on each 
scale of observation, the details of which I am relegating to footnotes here.29                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
documentation of their works over the years which include many of Tudor’s 
compositions. 
28 This project, which began as a personal endeavor, is now coupled with a larger project 
led by John Driscoll from ‘Composers Inside Electronics.’ My investigation on the 
Weatherings material was initiated under this context, especially through exchanges 
with Phil Edelstein. I thank Driscoll and Edelstein for their generous support and 
encouragement on my research. I have chosen to limit my description to my own 
trajectory and findings in this paper, however, since the group project is quite diverse 
and still at its preliminary stages for me to give a generic account from my individual 
perspective. 
29 Some of important categories of documentation in the archives are as follows:  
Rogalsky’s List: As for the instruments at Wesleyan, there is a comprehensive list of 
devices that Matt Rogalsky painstakingly put together in 1999. The state of preservation 
differs greatly from one instrument to another: some are utterly dysfunctional, other still 
operative. Many of the custom-built devices remain unknown as to their function. 
Rogalsky’s essential document compiles, whenever possible, the presumed function, 
designer, related composition, date, and a description for each device. It also includes a 
note on the sounds that came out when it was activated (though often times with no 
results, or just noise). For several relatively simple instruments, Rogalsky also wrote 
down their interior circuitry. Inside the Getty archives, a vast number of sketches for 
miscellaneous schematics exist, along with cutouts of articles from popular electronics 
magazines. My research has identified many of these as corresponding to the Wesleyan 
instruments. 
Diagrams: Since the late 1960s when he started composing his own works, and throughout 
the next decade, Tudor created neat block diagrams for the connection of components. 
The difficulty with these diagrams is twofold. First, the components are marked by 
idiosyncratic symbols or with equally enigmatic acronyms. Secondly, the composer was 
known to constantly change his components from one performance to another, even 
when performing the ‘same’ piece. So not only the accurate identification of each 
component is questionable, the notion of identity is in itself an issue. But these two 
issues might be complementary: the level of abstraction attained by the unconventional 
symbols in the diagram is in a way a practical method to notate the variety of actual, 
physical components that can fill in that particular function. The true omission of these 
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Rather than giving a general description of the materials, I choose to offer a ‘field 
report’ drafted from the localized perspective moving inside the archives, with a 
focus on a singular piece.  
Instigated by exchanges with John Driscoll and Phil Edelstein from 
‘Composers Inside Electronics,’ I delve into the materials of Weatherings, a work 
from 1979, which accompanied Cunningham company’s dance Exchange. A 
diagram showing the configuration of components is contained in the 
‘Weatherings’ folder of the Getty archives (Box 3, Folder 38). [Figure 1] 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
diagrams actually lies elsewhere: it does not depict the placement of loudspeakers which 
was crucial for Tudor’s works, nor any other details concerning the implementation of 
the work within the physical space.  
Matrix Maps: For most of the pieces after the 1980s, Tudor seemed to have abandoned the 
diagrams. Instead he made a list of inputs and outputs to the matrix switcher. D’Arcy 
Gray has addressed these lists as ”Matrix Maps” (D'Arcy Gray, ”David Tudor in the 
Late 1980s: Understanding a Secret Voice, ” Leonardo Music Journal 14-1, (2004): 41-
48). Matrix switcher allowed Tudor to control and rapidly shift the connection of any 
input to any output, and was used as the kernel of almost all of his compositions from 
this period. Matrix Maps are more specific in their information, but therefore less 
definitive, and do not convey the sense of relatively fixed configuration as the diagrams 
do.  
Sound Sources: Tudor alternated between works of no-input—in which components 
chained into a feedback network would operate as a giant oscillator, triggering sounds 
from inside its circuitry—, and works that used recorded sound sources, which were 
input to the chain of components for various modulation. There is actually no distinction 
between these two types of works when the entirety of the performance is seen as a 
system and the performer as one of its component. For then, what he does, including the 
playing back of a taped sound source, pertains to the internal operations of the system. 
In other words, the existence of input and output is correlated to the scale of 
observation, and what is observed as composition. But for the observer trying to revive 
Tudor’s pieces, the identification of sound sources is absolutely necessary. In many 
cases this can only be achieved by a close listening to available recordings of 
performances. In some rare occasions, one can find a list of tapes that Tudor wrote 
down for a particular performance. The specific maneuvers Tudor conducted to 
‘influence’ the other components and to keep the sounds going during the performance 
is very difficult to discern. There are only a couple of notes describing what he did at 
what time during a particular performance can be found—presumably written out after 
the concert, listening to a tape recording. In all other cases, the trajectory of a 
performance can only be followed through a comparative listening to the various 
recordings. 
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Figure 1 - Weatherings (1979), Diagram (Box 3, Folder 38) 
Copyright Notice: © J. Paul Getty Trust 
The Getty Research Institute, Los Angeles (940039) 
 
The components, consisting mostly of commercial devices, are laid out around 
two matrix switchers—one with 20 inputs and 10 outputs, and the other with 10 
inputs and 30 outputs. Matrices allowed Tudor to control and rapidly shift the 
connection of any input to any output in performances, and were used as kernels 
of almost all of his compositions from this period. There are 4 tape recorders 
going into the inputs 2 to 8 of the first matrix switcher, and 10 devices inserted in 
between the two matrix switchers. 10 outputs from the second matrix feed back 
into the input of the first, while the rest goes into 6 loudspeakers through 3 
mixers. 4 outputs from one mixer are panned and routed back into the first matrix 
switcher. The 10 modulating devices between the two matrices are marked by 
acronyms. Some are easy to discern (such as “EQ” for an equalizer), others are 
enigmatic. In order to identify the less obvious components, I go through an 
inventory of Tudor’s equipments dated ‘July 1979,’ found in another part of the 
archive (Box 30), presumably drafted for custom declaration when the composer 
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toured with the Cunningham company. [Figure 2] By comparing the names of 
components listed in this document with the acronyms, I am able to decipher most 
of them (“EM” = Maestro Envelope Modifier, “SL” = Electro-Harmonix Silencer, 
“TP” = Electro-Harmonix Talking Pedal, “OM” = Electro-Harmonix Octave 
Multiplexer, “CT” = Electro-Harmonix Clone Theory, “S1” and “S2” = Paia 
Synthespins, “PLL” = Phased-Locked Loop).  
 
 
Figure 2 - Equipment List from July 1979 (Box 30) 
Copyright Notice: © J. Paul Getty Trust 
The Getty Research Institute, Los Angeles (940039) 
At this point, one component remains unidentified: “P/F,” which is inserted in 
between output 2 and input 2 of the two matrices. No device from the inventory 
seems to correspond to these initials. So I assume it must be one of the “24 
custom sound processors.” But the search reaches a halt here. Days go by without 
any advancement. But then, one day, as I go through a completely separate 
section of the archive (Box 43, folder 6), I notice instruction notes for several 
components that were used in Weatherings, such as ‘the Silencer’ or ‘Clone 
Theory.’ Close to these notes, I find several cutout pages from a 1970s kit manual 
that contains schematics and board layouts for building a ‘Phaser/Flanger’—
“P/F.” [Figure 3]  
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Figure 3 - Phaser/Flanger, Schematics (Box 43, Folder 6) 
The Getty Research Institute, Los Angeles (940039) 
Nakai / Hear After
communication+1 Vol. 3 [2014], Iss. 1, Article 10
15
I then try to identify if there is any device out of all the instruments at Wesleyan 
that corresponds to this particular ‘Phaser/Flanger’ circuit. By comparing the 
board layout with actual circuit [Figure 4], I manage to locate the box: It is the 
instrument labeled ‘0039,’ which had previously been assumed to be a filter. 
[Figure 5] In fact, when I check the RCA jack inputs and outputs on the back of 
the device, I see that they are labeled “P/F OUT -A+B,” “P/F IN 1” and so on. 
[Figure 6] Since a phaser/flanger delays the input signal and mixes it onto the 
signal itself to produce a sweeping effect, the “D OUT” “D IN” labels stand for 
the ‘delay’ function. The peculiar algebra (“OUT A+B”) corresponds to another 
function of the phaser/flanger, which can simulate stereo sound from a mono 
source, by sending a phased output derived by adding the delayed signal to one 
channel, and sending another output derived by subtracting the delayed signal to 
the other. From the way Tudor had written out the algebras, I deduce that the 
same device must be the component notated as “a-b/a+b” in the diagrams of 
Toneburst (1975) and Pulsers (1976-78)—two works immediately preceding 
Weatherings. [Figure 7] In both cases, the “a-b/a+b” box receives one input and 
outputs two, thus matching the function of simulating stereo from a mono source.  
 
 
Figure 4 - Phaser/Flanger (Instrument '0039'), Circuit  
World Instrument Collection, Wesleyan University 
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Figure 5 and 6 - Phaser/Flanger, Front and Back 
World Instrument Collection, Wesleyan University 
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Figure 7 - Toneburst (1975), Diagram (Box 3, Folder 34) 
Copyright Notice: © J. Paul Getty Trust 
The Getty Research Institute, Los Angeles (940039) 
 
At this point, I have identified all the abbreviations of components in the diagram. 
But two pieces of information are still lacking to connect my findings to actual 
performance: the identity of sound sources played from the tape recorders, as well 
as the temporal outline of performance. As I go through folders in Box 4 at the 
Getty archive, which assembles unidentified sketches and notes, I come across a 
list of sound sources (and EQ settings) for Weatherings (Folder 11). [Figure 8] 
The abbreviations of sound sources are not difficult to decipher, and are all 
included in the recordings stored at GRI: “W. CHG SLO” = Wasp Chewing Slow, 
“W. CHG N” = Wasp Chewing Normal, “BK” = Brooklyn Kids, “EM” = EEG 
modulated, “AL. A/F N” = Alpha Amplitude Modulation/Frequency Modulation 
Normal, “Dd. AL.” = Demodulated Alpha, “M, t.t. N.” = Mosquito in test tube 
normal. In another folder nearby (Folder 7), I find a note taken by Tudor while 
listening to a recording of a Weatherings performance. [Figure 9] It lists up 
timings for the playback of various sound sources, activation of components, and 
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description of events. The corresponding recording might be the performance at 
Ohio State University on May 6, 1981, also archived at GRI.30 Several things do 
align—especially notable are the entry points for ‘modulated EEG’ (at 5:50), and 
‘Demodulated Alpha’ (which happens not at 9:45 but around 10:08). But the 
correspondences seem to decrease towards the latter half of the recording, so it 
may have been from another, similar performance (or the Ohio State University 
performance could have partially followed this note).31  
 
Figure 8 - Weatherings, Tape Sources (Box 4, Folder 11) 
Copyright Notice: © J. Paul Getty Trust 
The Getty Research Institute, Los Angeles                                                                                                                 
30 David Tudor, ”Weatherings, [Ohio State University], 1981 May 6,” Los Angeles: David 
Tudor Papers, Getty Research Institute, Box1A, C12. Digital version available on the 
GRI website: http://hdl.handle.net/10020/980039_c012 (April 1, 2014). 
31 It was customary for Tudor to not only to vary his performances of a given piece from 
one concert to another, but also to constantly switch his components. Therefore, the 
definitive status of a block diagram must always be questioned and examined in 
comparison to many other diagram sketches, some of which also display intermediary 
stages from one piece to another.  
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Figure 9 - Weatherings, Time Table (Box 4, Folder 7) 
Copyright Notice: © J. Paul Getty Trust 
The Getty Research Institute, Los Angeles (940039) 
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7 
These meanderings portray a difficulty of sorts. Along with the gaze that moves 
through different scales of observation, the identification of what an ‘object’ is 
constantly shifts. And life and death are matters correlated to this movement.32 
The view from inside a specific device sees a network of electronic components—
resistors, transistors, capacitors, transformers, ICs, potentiometers, and so on—
some of which might be dead and others living. Observation on this level has its 
corresponding documentation in the form of schematics, connection diagrams, kit 
manuals, notes that list up resistor values or IC part numbers. Once outside of the 
device the observer now sees the network composed by this and other devices. 
Components are now on the level of devices such as mixers, modulators, 
oscillators, amplifiers, loud-speakers and so on, that one traces through with the 
aid of block diagrams, matrix maps, or photographs of Tudor’s tabletop settings. 
Firing up components would constitute yet another domain of interiority.  
                                                                                                                 
32 People often speak of instruments as being either alive or dead, depending on their 
general popularity or abandonment. Edmond Johnson traced the remarkable revival of 
the harpsichord starting from around the turn of the twentieth century, carefully 
analyzing the metaphors of life and death used to portray the fate of an instrument: 
”Whereas it might seem strange to speak of an instrument as having acquired an 
‘independent life,’ the harpsichord’s peculiar history had long attracted similar patterns 
of speech. As far back as the middle of the nineteenth century the instrument’s 
abandonment was described in terms of death or even extinction, and during its 
subsequent revival the harpsichord’s modern history has been written with terms 
borrowed liberally from the lexicon of rebirth and resurrection. Indeed, the last two 
centuries have seen the instrument widely represented, both verbally and pictorially, 
with figurations that invoke either life or death” (Edmond Johnson, ”The Death and 
Second Life of the Harpsichord,” Journal of Musicology 30, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 181). 
The facility of this figure of speech in relation to harpsichords is derived directly from 
the ease with which an observer can differentiate a harpsichord from other instruments, 
if not families of instruments, through their mechanism, sound, history, associated 
music, usage, and/or definition. Harpsichord is not a piano, and it is certainly not the 
Goldberg Variations. But Tudor’s work complicates this schema, or rather, exposes its 
inherent indeterminacy. For in Tudor’s music, the notion of ‘instrument’ can refer to 
individual devices, or the configuration of devices; as the notion of ‘work’ may 
encompass the configuration of instruments, and/or the performance. Moreover, the 
boundaries between one scale and another are not always clear. Just as several different 
instruments are chained to create one work, several works may use one specific 
instrument repeatedly (like the ‘Phase/Flanger’ which appears in Toneburst, Pulsers and 
Weatherings). The configuration of components often changed from one performance to 
another, while remarkably similar assemblies of instruments were given different titles 
and hence identified as different works. 
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The trajectory of observation thus decomposes compositions. The 
boundary between inside and outside is defined by scale and not space. Once the 
observer is ‘inside’ an object of a particular scale, the object disappears (or turns 
into the ‘environment’) and new objects appear in its interiority. Once ‘outside’ of 
it, an object withdraws from contact, concealing an interior not visible from the 
exterior and thus inexhaustible to observation. The existence of objects on 
multiple scales, in other words, renders a view from inside (of a certain object) to 
become, at the same time, a view from outside (of another object). Observation 
sets scales just to cross them over and turn them indeterminate by its own 
movement. 
 
8 
The strange relationship between the observer and objects thus observed can be 
connected to recent theoretical endeavors of Graham Harman. The tenet of his so-
called Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) is that objects withdraw from all 
relations—with humans, as well as other objects. Harman sees this withdrawal as 
constituting the ‘inner life’ of objects that is secluded from all external access, and 
inexhaustible to external observation. All relations between objects and humans, 
and among objects themselves are thus never direct, and must always be formed 
through a ‘vicarious causation’—mediation by and within a third object. But 
relations never reach the internal life of an object, and only serve to distort its 
realities: “We distort when we see, and distort when we use. (…) It is not human 
consciousness that distorts the reality of things, but relationality per se.”33 This 
ontological schema could perhaps be connected to Tudor’s music to explain the 
role of objects which serve as the infrastructure for the life of sounds that 
compose themselves. Sounds as well as signals emerge as distortions through the 
mismatched and indirect relations that components enter into. More accurately, 
sound/signal is distortion that is the relation, and thus constitutes the third object 
through which components can encounter. And as an object, it also withdraws 
from the perception of any other object-component. If this withdrawal of sounds 
from the components is seen as constituting a life of its own, then autopoiesis can 
happily take over the story from there.  
In fact, the philosophy of object orientation reads much like autopoiesis 
written in reverse. They first of all share the same premise: a strict closure on the 
side of objects (machines) with inner lives that in no way can be reduced to the 
description of the observer. From there, they pace in contrary directions. Whereas 
autopoiesis delves into the closure to depict its operations from within, OOO 
adheres to the position of the exterior observer. On one side there is only a view                                                                                                                 
33 Graham Harman, ”Vicarious Causation,” Collapse II (London: Urbanomic, 2007): 193. 
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from inside to account for living systems, and on the other, there is only a view 
from outside to contemplate objects with inner life. Accordingly, the continuity 
that is life is defined in extreme positivity (tautology of the view from inside) in 
autopoiesis, which OOO flips around to a dedicated negativity (irreducibility to 
the view from outside). Once the basic frame of description is thus set, application 
follows suit—the condition of interiority and exteriority is generalized. Thus, 
OOO distributes the status of external observation to all objects, whereas 
autopoiesis reflects on the act of cognition as a production process that produces 
its own components. True, the biologists proceed with more caution, since they 
had started their inquiry by the paradoxical move of abandoning the status of the 
observer. For the philosopher who never really left his ground, the observer 
becomes an unexamined premise in the composition of his narrative. 
Consequently, the sensitivity to the gaze of observation and language of 
description in autopoeisis becomes coated by an utmost indifference in Harman’s 
philosophy.  
This withdrawal of the observer leads to an explosion of what the 
philosopher can account for. Harman’s objective is an inquiry into “an ontological 
feature of objects in general,”34 which is to say, “the basic structural features 
shared by all objects”35 [emphasis added]. But the generic totality here is more a 
matter of definition than observation. Admitting that ‘marbles’ “may not be 
‘marbles’ for anyone but humans or playful kittens,” Harman nonetheless 
provides a peculiar excuse to his generalization: “we need a nickname for the 
united object that we draw into our games.”36 But if they are not ‘marbles’ for 
anyone but humans or kittens, why the presumption that they are “unified objects” 
at all? The simple answer is because the philosopher defines ‘objects’ as such. 
Claiming that all objects in general conceal an inner life that cannot be accessed 
from the outside, does not release them from their correlation with humans—it 
merely turns the relationship into one that is defined negatively. The general and 
negative realism of objects is thus consumed under the transparent and 
determinate authority of the observer and his language of speculation. 
The secret withdrawal of the observer in Harman’s account is staged 
explicitly in Maturana and Varela’s writing. But as they leave behind the domain 
of description, they leave it intact. The line between the exteriority of the observer 
and the interior of the observed system is maintained as forever determinate, 
providing a space in which the philosopher may later dwell. The view from inside 
and the view from outside are thus not only contrary, but also complementary. 
But the position of the observer is neither here nor there. It is not as stable as                                                                                                                 
34 Harman, ibid., 205. 
35 Harman, ibid., 204. 
36 Harman, ibid., 205. 
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object-oriented ontology claims, and not as easily dismissible as autopoiesis 
desires it to be. Observation stays neither in nor out. It proceeds by decomposing 
the very boundaries between inside and outside that it composes—decomposing 
objects into environments, and composing environments into objects. The 
interiority of observation is this view that traverses and oscillates indeterminately 
between a view from inside and a view from outside. And the indeterminacy of 
the observer is that of objects, for observation is the distorted relation between 
one thing and another. The immanence of life is located neither inside an object 
nor inside a process, but inside the oscillation between processes and objects. The 
view from inside, in other words, is a matter of time. 
 
9 
Maturana and Varela attempted to dissect the ‘influence’ of the observer in their 
description by reducing the time of systems to its minuscule, singular point of 
operation: the atemporal present. But object orientation offers a contrary path to 
the same problem (the relativization of the notion of time introduced by the 
observer) by opening up the time of objects to its maximum diversity and 
multiplicity. This path was cultivated not so much by the philosopher of our 
century, but by computer scientists and programmers of the past century working 
around the same time as Tudor or Maturana and Varela, from whom Harman 
presumably derived the name of his project (“Of course, philosophy is about 
opinion and engineering about deeds”37).  
Object-oriented programming was a revolutionary approach in computer 
science primarily developed by Alan Kay circa 1970. It replaced the previous top-
down programming paradigm with a method of computing that arises from the 
interaction of closed smaller elements called ‘objects’ which encapsulated a 
certain useful structure. Kay imagined each ‘object’ as being “a recursion of the 
entire possibilities of the computer.”38 Thus, the difference of scale between the 
computer as an object and objects within computers is again entwined with the 
movement of the observation. “In effect, he started out to build a computer 
language that would enable the programmer to look at the host computer not as a 
serial instruction follower, but as thousands of independent computers, each one 
able to command the power of the whole machine.”39                                                                                                                  
37 Alan Kay, “The Early History of Smalltalk,” ACM SIGPLAN Notices, Vol. 28, No. 3 
(March 1993): 71. 
38 Kay, ibid., 71. 
39 Casey Alt, “Objects of Our Affection: How Object Orientation Made Computers a 
Medium,” in Media Archaeology: Approaches, Applications, and Implications 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011), 287. 
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As the notion of whole became distributed among the various objects, a 
new conception of time emerged. Instead of the linear universal time that 
proceeds step by step aligning the program from outside, time now had to be 
embedded inside each object. As Casey Alt noted, this idea of assigning different 
times to each object is most apparent in the notion of ‘late-binding.’ In 
comparison to the method of ‘early binding’ in which all the variable name 
linkages are determined before the execution of the program, ‘late binding’ leaves 
the reference linkage of each object undetermined until the run-time of the 
program. As a result, “late binding allows the object to remain open and ‘wait’ for 
messages.”40 This ‘waiting’ creates “an internal, subjective duration specific to 
each individual object,” which “opens up the ability for programmers to infuse 
their programming objects with affect.”41 What accords life to objects here is 
neither its continuous operation nor its eternal withdrawal. It is the indeterminate 
duration of ‘waiting’ that cannot be computed within a singular universal time.42 
There is latency inside the object, between the input and output, as there are 
temporal gaps between objects. Life is conditioned by a state that would be 
difficult to distinguish from dormancy or death to an observer with no patience.  
 
 
                                                                                                                 
40 Alt, ibid., 294. 
41 Alt, ibid., 296. 
42 The operative mechanism of object-oriented programming, as well as the analogy of 
workers building without a universal plan, have a striking resemblance to the music of 
Christian Wolff. In his works from the 1960s, Wolff set up an intricate system of cues, 
wherein the performers' playing of a certain material was conditioned by the perception 
of a particular sound event. A whole composition, in other words, structured by 
individual performers waiting for the occurrence of a given particular position and 
relation. Naturally, the mismatch between what is played and what is heard renders the 
whole performance indeterminate. It is always possible for a performer to mishear his 
cue, or the performance to halt because all performers are waiting for each other's 
sound. Wolff's compositions were closely connected to Tudor. The system of cues, 
which forces the performer to make decisions in real time, was partially created in order 
to cope with Tudor's tendency as a pianist to prepare and determine all the details of his 
performance in advance. Tudor in return singled out the importance of Wolff's music, 
even after he turned to electronic music: ”Christian Wolff never delineates a universe. 
He deals with possibilities which one could use if one wanted to. That's what is so 
beautiful about his pieces, because they don't express a composite view ” (Tudor, ”From 
Piano to Electronics,” 25). As mentioned earlier, in footnote 11, the only non-electronic 
piece in the repertoire of ‘Composers Inside Electronics,’ was Wolff ’s Changing the 
System (1972). 
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This view of objects in wait not only modifies the general, determinate negativity 
of object-oriented ontology into a specific, indeterminate mechanism; it also adds 
a critical twist to the account of autopoiesis. Towards the end of his paper 
‘Biology of Cognition,’ which preceded his collaborative endeavor with Varela 
by three years (but later included in the same book), Maturana gave an analogy to 
the difference between the actual operation of living systems and that described 
by the observer:  
Let us suppose that we want to build two houses. For such a 
purpose we hire two groups of thirteen workers each. We name 
one of the workers of the first group as the group leader and give 
him a book which contains all the plans of the house showing in a 
standard way the layout of walls, water pipes, electric connections, 
windows, etc., plus several views in perspective of the finished 
house. The workers study the plans and under the guidance of the 
leader construct the house, approximating continuously the final 
state prescribed by the description. In the second group we do not 
name a leader, we only arrange the workers in a starting line in the 
field and give each of them a book, the same book for all, 
containing only neighborhood instructions. These instructions do 
not contain words such as house, pipes, or windows, nor do they 
contain drawings or plans of the house to be constructed; they 
contain only instructions of what a worker should do in the 
different positions and in the different relations in which he finds 
himself as his position and relations change.  
Although these books are all identical, the workers read and apply 
different instructions because they start from different positions 
and follow different paths of change. The end result in both cases 
is the same, namely, a house. The workers of the first group 
construct something whose final appearance they know all the 
time, while the workers of the second group have no views of what 
they are building, nor do they need to have obtained them even 
when they are finished. For the observer both groups are building a 
house, and he knows it from the start, but the house that the second 
group builds lies only in his cognitive domain; the house build by 
the first group, however, is also in the cognitive domain of the 
workers.43 
                                                                                                                 
43 Maturana and Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition, 53-54. 
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But this analogy distorts autopoiesis’ longing for the purity of circular production. 
For if the thirteen workers, in the absence of a universal program, only follow 
instructions that are activated when and only when a particular position and 
relation is attained, then there is nothing to determine in advance how long the 
building process will take. The particular situation necessary to trigger the next 
action may not occur for an indefinite amount of time. The workers must then 
simply wait. The production process might still be in operation, but at a speed too 
slow that it escapes cognition. Life defined by waiting renders the very distinction 
between life and death indeterminate. Maturana probably did not consider 
autopoietic systems that would take years to produce the next production. 
Although a perfectly logical possibility that is derived from his own analogy, the 
idea of a living system that only breathes (so to speak) once every decade or every 
century goes directly against the biologist’s tendency to imagine the life of 
systems from the temporal length and speed of his own life. Autopoiesis did away 
with the primacy of physical space by accounting for spaces of autopoietic 
systems via topology. But the same kind of abstraction was never considered for 
temporality.  
 
11 
Artworks are created precisely to wait in the stead of humans who cannot. They 
are vicars that stand in for our impatience. To use Christopher Wood and 
Alexander Nagel’s formulation, “The work of art ‘anachronizes’”44—it is always 
belated, and it constantly lingers. But by dropping out of time and effacing the 
very notion of contemporaneity, “it points forward to all its future recipients who 
will activate and reactivate it as a meaningful event.” Thus, the life of works in 
wait is a life that starts as an afterlife.45                                                                                                                  
44 Christopher Wood and Alexander Nagel, Anachronic Rennaissance (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2010), 13. 45  It is for this reason that the perspective of media archaeology is pertinent, for instance 
when Wolfgang Ernst observes that technical media reveal their essence only in their 
operation, which can be ‘activated’ at any historical moment as long as they are 
functional. ”There is no ‘historical’ difference in the functioning of the apparatus now 
and then. (…) ‘Historic’ media objects are radically present when they still function, 
even if their outside world has vanished. Their ‘inner world,’ is still operative” 
(Wolfgang Ernst, ”Media Archaeography: Method and Machine versus History and 
Narrative of Media,” in Media Archaeology (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 2011), 241). But the condition of waiting is not unique to technical media as 
Ernst claims, and the notion of media that he speaks of must be generalized. Even a 
Greek vase is not merely an archaeological object, but also a technical artifact that 
awaits activation.  
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The correlation between the (after)life of works and the possibility of their 
activation is, however, coupled with the indeterminacy of the observer who is 
always preoccupied with his own life, always in transit from one inside to another 
at its own pace—from one life to another, and thus from one death to another. 
Objects and art works are always partially dead because the observer (human and 
non-human) cannot wait, or waits for too long. In other words, death is an effect 
produced by the mismatch of speeds between systems. But so is sound, as noted 
above. That is why the lethal indeterminacy of observation and objects 
permeating the afterlife of Tudor’s compositions outside the living present of his 
music, turns out precisely to be what operated inside his performances as they 
sprung into a life of their own. Latencies within, and in between, components and 
their partial influences upon each other (mutual listening processes) compose the 
atemporal and perpetually living present of autopoietic sound systems.  
Tudor often claimed that the objective of his compositions were to 
discover the ‘nature’ of electronic components. The program note for Untitled, 
declared the piece as being “part of a never-ending series of discovered works in 
which electronic components are found to be natural objects.”46 A similar 
description was used to address the instrumental loudspeakers of Rainforest: 
“Each output mechanism has its own bias. So I must see what its properties are as 
a natural phenomenon, and not spend my time making it do something against its 
nature.”47 Each electronic component, each output mechanism (once composed), 
has its own nature, an “internal, subjective duration specific to each individual 
object,” that can be ‘discovered’ (and perhaps ‘influenced’) through their use. 
Tudor’s composition brings together objects of various natures with different 
speeds and latencies to form “an electronic ecology.”48 And this was an ecology, 
like any other ecology—constituted by deaths and processes of decomposition, 
partial and distributed around the network; difficult to see through, but with 
plenty to hear.49                                                                                                                 
46 David Tudor, “Program notes for Untitled (1972),” Los Angeles: David Tudor Papers, 
Getty Research Institute, Box 3, Folder 35. 
47 Tudor, “From Piano to Electronics,” 26. 
48 ”Electronic ecology” was a term often used by Tudor to describe Rainforest. See, for 
instance: David Tudor, “Program notes for Composers Inside Electronics’ concert at 
Fstival d’Automne Paris (1976)” Los Angeles: David Tudor Papers, Getty Research 
Institute, Box 19, Folder 11. 
49 There is a curious tendency that can be observed among theories of operationally closed 
systems such as autopoiesis, to resort to metaphors of sound and music to overcome a 
particular conundrum inherent in their theoretical disposition: namely, the plurality of 
closures, and the relationship between one closed system and another. The sonic 
domain, in other words, has continuously been summoned to articulate the mechanisms 
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The music that sprung to life once activated also died every night—whether at the 
discretion of the performer or not. The composer would then simply pack his 
instruments and take them home, continuing to observe the lives of electronic 
components in the past and after life of sounds, waiting for them to reveal a new 
musical idea to him. From one inside to another, and from one life to another, he 
proceeded. And we have tried to recompose his steps in our observation. For an 
observer to account properly, albeit always tentatively, for endings, it must move 
out from the particular inside it finds itself in. We thus end, tentatively, on that 
note. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
that remain hidden to visible articulations. Leibniz, for instance, employed the concept 
of 'Echo' in his letters to Bartholomew des Bosses to explain the paradoxical nature of 
‘Composite Substance’--an aggregation of supposedly autonomous and singular monads 
(Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, The Leibniz-Des Bosses Correspondence, translated 
and edited by Brandon C. Look and Donald Rutherford (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2007), 337). Biologist Jakob von Uexküll used the imagery of 
'symphony' or 'score' to account for the relationship between numerous ‘Umwelten,’ a 
self-contained semiotic world that a given species uniquely creates and inhabits (Jakob 
von Uexküll, “The Theory of Meaning,” Semiotica 42, 1 (1982): 25–82). Following this 
lineage, Niklas Luhmann introduced the term 'resonance' to theorize the mechanism of 
environmental problem--an issue wherein the behavior of social systems directly affects, 
and is affected back from, its environment, and thus one that is by nature difficult to 
articulate through autopoiesis, which regards systems as having no input nor output 
(Niklas Luhmann, Ecological Communication, translated by John Bednarz, Jr. 
(Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1989), 15). The force of these musical and sonic 
metaphors, however, should not be regarded as demonstrating the sheer transcendence 
of sound that overcomes the boundaries of systems, but rather as merely indicating the 
different types of articulation that can be formed via sounds, which may serve to 
relativize the visual primacy of systems theory. 
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